

# First Price and Second Price Auction Games. Equilibria detection.

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Conventional (Nash [1], strong Nash [3]) and unconventional ( $t$ -immune strategies [5]) equilibria for first price and second price auction games are computed by the use of generative relations [2] and evolutionary computation. The different game equilibria of auction games express different player behavior and rationality. We use numerical examples to analyze and discuss the implications of using different equilibria types for auction games.

## References

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